Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Working Papers

Economic Science Institute

2021

Differences in Cognitive Reflection Mediate Gender Differences in
Social Preferences
Antonio M. Espín
University of Granada

Valerio Capraro
Middlesex University

Brice Corgnet
Emlyon Business School

Simon Gächter
University of Nottingham

Roberto Hernán-González
Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers
Part of the Econometrics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Espín, A. M., Capraro, V., Corgnet, B., Gächter, S., Hernán-González, R., Kujal, P., & Rassenti, S. (2021).
Differences in cognitive reflection mediate gender differences in social preferences. ESI Working Paper
21-22. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/359/

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in ESI Working Papers by an authorized administrator of
Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Differences in Cognitive Reflection Mediate Gender Differences in Social
Preferences
Comments
ESI Working Paper 21-22

Authors
Antonio M. Espín, Valerio Capraro, Brice Corgnet, Simon Gächter, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal,
and Stephen Rassenti

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/
esi_working_papers/359

Differences in cognitive reflection mediate gender differences in social
preferences
Antonio M. Espín1,2,*, Valerio Capraro3, Brice Corgnet4, Simon Gächter5,6,7, Roberto HernánGonzález8, Praveen Kujal3, & Stephen Rassenti9
Author affiliations:
1. Department of Social Anthropology, University of Granada, Campus de Cartuja S/N,
18071 Granada, Spain.
2. Loyola Behavioral Lab, Loyola University Andalusia, Escritor Castilla Aguayo 4, 14004
Córdoba, Spain.
3. Department of Economics, Middlesex University Business School, The Burroughs,
London NW4 4BT, United Kingdom.
4. Emlyon Business School, GATE-LSE UMR 5824, France.
5. School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2QX, United Kingdom.
6. IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9, 53113 Bonn, Germany.
7. CESifo, Poschingerstraße 5, 81679 Munich, Germany.
8. Burgundy School of Business, Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CEREN EA 7477,
Dijon, France.
9. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA
92866, United States.
*Corresponding author. E-mail: kanton@ugr.es.

Abstract
Previous studies have shown that women tend to be more egalitarian and less self-interested
than men whereas men tend to be more concerned with social efficiency motives. The roots of
such differences, however, remain unknown. Since different cognitive styles have also been
associated with different distributional social preferences, we hypothesise that gender
differences in social preferences can be partially explained by differences in cognitive styles
(i.e., women rely more on intuition whereas men are more reflective). We test this hypothesis
meta-analytically using data from seven studies conducted in four countries (USA, Spain,
India, and UK; n=6,910) where cognitive reflection and social preferences were measured for
men and women. In line with our hypothesis, differences in cognitive reflection scores explain
up to 41% of the gender differences in social preferences. The mediation is barely affected by
variables such as cognitive ability or study-level characteristics. These results suggest that the
socio-ecological or cultural pressures that influence gender differences in cognitive styles are
also partially responsible for gender differences in social preferences.
Keywords: gender differences; cognitive reflection; social preferences; self-interest; social
efficiency; egalitarianism.
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INTRODUCTION
Previous studies suggest that men and women differ in several behaviours and traits. One of
these often-reported gender differences, at least in patriarchal-patrilineal societies, refers to
distributional social preferences. Men tend to choose allocations that maximise their own
and/or the total group output, whereas women are more concerned with reducing payoff
differences between people (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Dickinson & Tiefenthaler, 2002;
Fehr et al., 2006; Engel, 2011; Martinsson et al., 2011; Durante et al., 2014; Kamas & Preston,
2015; Rand et al., 2016; Stieglitz et al., 2017; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018a; Cetre et al., 2019;
Capraro, 2020; Müller & Renes, 2020). According to standard classifications of social
preferences (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Liebrand, 1984; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr &
Schmidt, 2006; Van Lange et al., 2007; Balliet et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2011), this means
that men are more likely to be classified as self-interested or social efficiency-concerned
whereas women are more likely to be classified as egalitarian. Given that both social efficiency
and egalitarianism are prosocial preferences, the above implies that neither gender is more
prosocial than the other; it will depend on the type of prosociality considered (Andreoni &
Vesterlund, 2001; Croson & Gneezy, 2009).
However, the mechanisms underlying such gender differences remain unknown. While it is
important to uncover behavioural differences between men and women, understanding the
underlying mechanisms that can account for some of these differences is critical in assessing
their origins and implications. In this paper, we conjecture that gender differences in cognitive
style might be an essential mechanism towards understanding social preferences. We thus
investigate the extent to which gender differences in social preferences can be accounted for
by differences in cognitive reflection.
Our hypothesis is based on two stylised facts in the literature, which we review below: first,
men and women tend to differ in their level of cognitive reflection and, second, differences in
cognitive reflection are typically associated with differences in social preferences.
Cognitive reflection is defined as the disposition to suppress intuitive responses and engage in
effortful reasoning and is usually measured using the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick,
2005). In its original version, the CRT consists of a set of three questions, each of which has
an intuitive yet wrong answer. People need to override their automatic response to find the
correct answer. Thus, high CRT scores are associated with a reflective (often referred to as
“analytic”, e.g., Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015) cognitive style. Regarding
gender differences in cognitive styles, it is now well documented that men tend to give more
reflective/analytic answers than women on the CRT (Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009;
Hoppe & Kusterer, 2011; Bosch-Domènech et al., 2014; Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Cueva
et al., 2016; see Brañas-Garza et al., 2019 for a meta-analysis). These results suggest that
women tend to show comparatively more reliance on intuition vs. reflection than men.
Recent studies have shown that differences in cognitive reflection can account for differences
in distributional social preferences. Ponti & Rodriguez-Lara (2015) found that reflective
participants (defined as those scoring two or three on the three-item CRT) were more likely to
maximise the other’s payoff only when this had no negative monetary consequences for the
decision maker. This led to an increase in the total payoff of both players, thus promoting social
efficiency. By contrast, intuitive participants (defined as those giving two or three intuitive but
wrong answers) appeared to be more egalitarian. In addition, they reported that reflective
individuals were more self-interested. Corgnet et al. (2015a) showed that high CRT scores were
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positively associated with “mild altruism”, which consists in increasing the payoff of the other
whenever the personal cost of doing so it not too high. This result is in line with Ponti and
Rodriguez-Lara (2015) because mild altruism typically promotes social efficiency. By contrast,
low CRT scores were found to be associated with egalitarian and spiteful choices. Capraro et
al. (2017) found high CRT scores to be associated with social efficiency and, albeit rather
weakly, to self-interest, whereas low CRT scores were associated with spiteful and egalitarian
choices. In addition, they found that the experimental manipulation of cognitive style using
time constraints led to similar conclusions. That is, inducing reflective decision making, using
a response time delay, prompted more efficient allocations, whereas inducing intuitive thinking
using time pressure prompted more egalitarian and spiteful allocations. In line with previous
findings, Cueva et al. (2016) found that low CRT individuals were more egalitarian and less
self-interested than high CRT ones. Czerwonka et al. (2017) also found that high CRT scores
were associated with self-interested behaviour in the dictator game.
In sum, previous research has shown that: (i) men tend to be more self-interested and care more
about social efficiency than women whereas women tend to be more egalitarian; (ii) men tend
to score higher than women in the CRT; and (iii) high CRT scores tend to be associated with
self-interested and efficient allocation decisions, while low CRT scores tend to be associated
with egalitarian allocations (low CRT has also been associated with spiteful allocations
(Corgnet et al., 2015a; Capraro et al., 2017), but systematic gender differences in spitefulness
have not been reported). Based on this, we conjectured that the effect of gender on
distributional social preferences can be mediated by cognitive reflection. That is, gender
differences in cognitive style may explain why women are more egalitarian and less selfinterested and social efficiency-concerned than men. If our hypothesis is correct, then the
evolutionary (biological or cultural), environmental, or socio-ecological factors that are
responsible for the gender differences in cognitive style (see, e.g., Overman et al., 1996;
Halpern, 2013; Hyde, 2014 for discussions on the nature of cognitive gender differences), also
underlie part of the gender differences in social preferences.
In this paper, we explore this potential mediation. We do so by applying meta-analytical
techniques to a dataset consisting of 6,910 participants from seven different studies, with 29
different subsamples, and from four countries (USA, UK, India, and Spain). Importantly,
analysing gender differences was not the main goal in any of the seven studies, and none of the
articles based on these studies examined them either. See Materials and Methods for details.
For all samples, we have data regarding gender, CRT scores, and a series of mini-dictator
games that allow us to classify participants’ social preferences into four relevant behavioural
types: self-interested, socially efficient, egalitarian, and spiteful. (Note that since previous
studies have shown a negative relationship between CRT scores and spiteful allocations
(Corgnet et al., 2015a; Capraro et al., 2017), we included spitefulness for completeness;
however, its analysis is relegated to the Supplementary Materials because the literature has not
reported gender differences in spitefulness.) Following Capraro et al. (2017), and for the sake
of robustness, we use two different definitions for each type. The “model-based” classification
relies on a theoretical definition of the preference parameters whereas the “choice-based”
classification is obtained by calculating the proportion of participants’ choices that are
consistent with each social preference type. See Materials and Methods.
We find that, compared to women, men are more likely to be classified as self-interested and
concerned with social efficiency, whereas women are more likely to be classified as egalitarian.
We also find that men score higher than women in the CRT. Regarding the relationship
3

between CRT scores and social preferences, we find that participants with higher CRT scores
are more likely to be classified as self-interested and efficiency-concerned, and less likely to
be classified as egalitarian (and spiteful, but spitefulness is unrelated to gender and is therefore
not the focus of this paper). All these results are consistent with previous literature.
In terms of mediation, although the effect of CRT on social preference classifications remains
largely unaffected whether gender is controlled for or not, gender differences in self-interest,
efficiency, and egalitarianism are reduced by a large amount (between 20% and 41%) when
CRT is controlled for. Moreover, according to structural equation modelling, the indirect effect
of gender on social preferences mediated by CRT is significant for all four behavioural types
(including spitefulness, even though total gender effect is not significant). These findings
indicate that cognitive reflection explains a substantial fraction of the gender differences in
social preferences. Importantly, the results are robust to a series of potential confounding
factors and moderators, such as cognitive ability, risk and time preferences, age, and country.
The results are also robust to methodological differences across studies such as whether the
CRT was incentivised or not, whether the data was gathered online or in a physical lab, and
whether social preference decisions were made under time constraints or not.

RESULTS
Main analysis
Gender and CRT scores
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of CRT scores by gender in the pooled dataset of
the seven studies. The distribution of men’s scores strictly dominates the distribution of
women’s scores. 17.2% of women score zero on the CRT (i.e., zero reflective/correct answers),
while among men zero-scorers represent 10.4%; also, 56.4% of women give two reflective
answers or less, while for men this percentage is reduced to 39.0%. Statistical significance and
effect sizes are obtained using meta-analysis and are reported in supplementary Figure S1.

Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of CRT scores by gender. Shown are the pooled data from the
seven studies used in our analysis. The distribution of men’s scores first-order stochastically
dominates the distribution of women’s scores.
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As shown in Figure S1, using p<0.05 as a threshold for statistical significance, men score
significantly higher than women on the CRT in all seven studies, which corroborates previous
findings (e.g., Frederick, 2005; Brañas-Garza et al., 2019). According to the overall effect size,
women give, on average, 0.810 (95% CI = (-0.937, -0.682)) fewer reflective/correct answers
than men, over an observed mean of 2.914 (SD = 2.121). The effect size corresponds to 0.382
SDs; a moderate yet substantially larger effect than typical effect sizes for gender differences
observed in the literature (Hyde 1981; 2005; see Supplementary Materials). This suggests a
causal link of gender on CRT [G→CRT], therefore complying with the first condition for
mediation (see Materials and Methods).
Social preferences and CRT scores
Regarding the influence of CRT scores on social preferences (i.e., path [CRT→SPT], see
Materials and Methods), Figure 2 shows the fraction of individuals classified as self-interested
(panel a), social efficiency-concerned (panel b), and egalitarian (panel c) for each CRT score.
The meta-analytic results for the estimated linear relationship between the preference dummies
and CRT are shown in Figures S2-S7 (left panel).
We find that participants with higher CRT scores are overall more likely to be classified as
self-interested. Each correct answer is associated with an increase of 0.031 (0.022, 0.039) and
0.034 (0.027, 0.042) in the probability of being classified as self-interested using the modelbased and choice-based definitions, respectively (both p<0.001; the mean proportion of selfinterested individuals in the sample is 0.296 and 0.260, respectively). The positive sign of this
effect holds in all seven studies according to both definitions and is always significant except
for Study 3 using the model-based approach (p=0.074). See Figure 2a.
Participants with higher CRT are also more likely to be classified as social efficiency-concerned
(both approaches yield p<0.001; significant in all seven studies using the model-based, and in
all but Study 2 (p=0.569) and Study 7 (p=0.104) using the choice-based approach). The
estimated effects are 0.070 (0.064, 0.075) and 0.037 (0.031, 0.044) according to the modelbased and choice-based classifications, for which the mean proportions of efficient individuals
are 0.390 and 0.240, respectively. See Figure 2b.
Finally, individuals with higher CRT are less likely to be classified as egalitarian (both
p<0.001; significantly so in all seven studies using the model-based approach, and in all but
Study 3 (p=0.163) using the choice-based approach). The estimated effects are -0.065 (-0.070,
-0.059) and -0.031 (-0.040, -0.023) according to the model-based and choice-based
classifications, which yield mean proportions of egalitarian individuals of 0.474 and 0.526,
respectively. See Figure 2c. These relationships are consistent with previous literature (e.g.,
Capraro et al., 2017; Corgnet et al., 2015a) and provide necessary checks for our study of
mediation.
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Figure 2. CRT score and social preference type. The figure shows the fraction of individuals
classified as a. self-interested; b. social efficiency-concerned; c. egalitarian per CRT score. Observed
mean proportions from the pooled sample. Error bars represent 95% CI.

Gender differences in social preferences explained by CRT scores
Now we turn to the main results focusing on the links between gender and social preference
types [G→SPT] and the same links, controlling for CRT [CRT; G→SPT] (see Materials and
Methods). Figure 3 displays a summary of the meta-analytic results reported in the main
supporting Figures M1-M6. Figure 3 shows the fraction of women and men who are classified
as self-interested (panel a), social efficiency-concerned (panel b), and egalitarian (panel c).
These values are computed considering the observed mean of the social preference dummies,
the meta-analytic overall effects (see below), and the percentage of women in the total sample
(53.75%). The gender gap for each social preference type (i.e., path [G→SPT]) is divided into
two parts: share that cannot be explained by CRT (path [CRT; G→SPT], in red) and share that
6

can be explained by CRT (i.e., the difference between paths [G→SPT] and [CRT; G→SPT],
in purple). The percentage of the gender gap which is explained by CRT is reported next to
each bar.

Figure 3. Summary of the main meta-analytic results. The figure shows the fraction of women and
men who are classified as a. self-interested; b. social efficiency-concerned; and c. egalitarian.
Fractions are computed considering the observed mean of the social preference dummies, the metaanalytic overall effects, and the percentage of women in the sample. Left-hand and right-hand bars
refer to the model-based and choice-based classification, respectively. The gender gap for each social
preference type is divided into two parts: share that cannot be explained by CRT (in red) and share
that can be explained by CRT (in purple). The percentage of the gender gap which is explained by
CRT is reported next to each bar. Full results are presented in main supporting Figures M1-M6.
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Regarding path [G→SPT], that is, the total effect of gender (female = 1, male = 0) on social
preferences, we find that, compared to men, women are overall less likely to be classified as
self-interested (both approaches yield p<0.001; Figures M1 and M4, left panel). This holds in
all seven studies, but significantly so only in Study 5 using both approaches (for Study 5, both
p<0.001; but there are also several cases in which the effect is close to significance: for Study
6 in the model-based classification, and for Study 1, 3, 6, and 7 in the choice-based
classification, all 0.05<p<0.10). To make sure our findings are not driven by a single study, we
computed the overall effect after excluding Study 5 and still find p<0.001 in both the modelbased and choice-based classifications. The proportion of self-interested individuals is 0.082 (0.109, -0.056) and 0.076 (-0.096, -0.055) smaller among women, according to the model-based
and choice-based classifications, respectively. These are the gender gaps reported in Figure 3
(panel a for self-interest).
Women are also less likely to be classified as social efficiency-concerned regardless of the
classification approach (both p<0.001; Figures M2 and M5, left panel). The direction of the
effect holds in all seven studies, significantly so in all studies but Study 2 and 4 according to
the model-based approach (p=0.098 and p=0.134, respectively), and in all studies but Study 6
and 7 according to the choice-based approach (p=0.066 and p=0.331, respectively). The
estimated effects are -0.134 (-0.166, -0.102) and -0.082 (-0.102, -0.062), respectively. See
Figure 3b.
Finally, women are more likely to be classified as egalitarian (both p<0.001; Figures M3 and
M6, left panel); which is significant in all seven studies regardless of the approach, except for
Study 3 and 7 when using the choice-based classification (p=0.096 and p=0.053, respectively).
The estimated effects are 0.163 (0.137, 0.189) and 0.122 (0.095, 0.148) for the model-based
and choice-based classifications, respectively. See Figure 3c.
In summary, path [G→SPT] is significant for all the three social preference types considered,
and the results are in line with previous literature (e.g., Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Engel,
2011; Capraro, 2020; Müller & Renes, 2020).
Next, we analyse the gender differences in social preferences when CRT is controlled for (i.e.,
path [CRT; G→SPT]; see Figures M1-M6, central panel). We observe that gender differences
are substantially reduced in all cases after the effect of cognitive reflection on social
preferences is eliminated. Overall, the gender coefficient is reduced by 29% (from the -0.082
above to -0.058 (-0.088, -0.028), model-based) to 33% (-0.051 (-0.077, -0.026), choice-based)
for self-interest. For social efficiency, it is reduced by 39% (-0.050 (-0.072, -0.027), choicebased) to 41% (-0.079 (-0.110, -0.048), model-based). For egalitarianism, the gender effect is
reduced by 20% (0.097 (0.069, 0.125), choice-based) to 36% (0.104 (0.077, 0.132), modelbased). See Figure 3.
Although gender differences continue to be significant overall after controlling for CRT for the
three preference types and regardless of the classification approach (all p’s<0.001), the number
of studies in which they are significant is reduced. For self-interest, gender differences remain
significant in Study 5 according to both approaches, whereas all the marginally significant
effects (i.e., with 0.05<p<0.10; five in total, see above) are not significant when CRT is
controlled for. For social efficiency, the number of studies reporting significant effects
decreases from five using both classifications to two and three studies according to the modelbased and choice-based classification, respectively. For egalitarianism, of the seven studies
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reporting a significant gender effect in the model-based approach, only three continue to do so
when CRT is controlled for. In the choice-based approach, only two studies report significant
gender differences when CRT is controlled for compared to five when it is not.
Finally, according to our meta-analysis of the indirect effects from structural equation
modelling (i.e., path [G→CRT→SPT], see Materials and Methods), the difference between the
total effect of gender on social preferences ([G→SPT]) and its effect when CRT is controlled
for ([CRT; G→SPT]) is significant for the three social preference types being considered,
regardless of the classification approach (all p’s<0.001; see Figures M1-M6, right panel). It
should be noted that, while in each subsample the indirect effect coincides numerically with
the difference between paths [G→SPT] and [CRT; G→SPT], the overall indirect effects vary
slightly due to the meta-analysis random-effects weights. In general, the resulting overall
indirect effects are smaller in size than the mediation effects obtained using the difference
value, which are plotted in Figure 3, because smaller differences tend to display smaller
variance and are thus assigned higher weights.
Regarding self-interest, the overall indirect effects are -0.017 ((-0.023, -0.010), significant in
all studies except in Study 3, 6, and 7 with p=0.137, p=0.080, and p=0.074, respectively) for
the model-based classification and -0.019 ((-0.026, -0.013), significant in all studies) for the
choice-based classification. For social efficiency, we find indirect effects of -0.048 ((-0.058, 0.038), significant in all studies) and -0.023 ((-0.031, -0.015), significant in all studies except
for Study 2 and 7, with p=0.249 and p=0.282, respectively) using the model-based and choicebased approach, respectively. The indirect effects are 0.044 ((0.036, 0.052), significant in all
studies but Study 2, p=0.102) and 0.017 ((0.010, 0.024), significant in all studies except in
Study 3 and 6, with p=0.265 and p=0.062, respectively), for model-based and choice-based
egalitarianism, respectively.
Given the conditions outlined above, these findings indicate that the effect of gender on selfinterest, efficiency, and egalitarian preferences is mediated by the CRT score. Yet, given that
the gender (direct) effects are significant after CRT is controlled for, the mediation is partial:
between 20% and 41% of the gender differences in social preferences, depending on the
preference and classification approach considered, can be explained by differences in CRT
scores.
Robustness checks
In this section, we analyse how robust the above results are to: (i) changing the direction of the
paths, i.e., whether gender drives the relationship between CRT and social preferences, rather
than the opposite; (ii) controlling for different individual-level covariates which can potentially
confound the results (age, risk and time preferences, and cognitive ability); (iii) potential
moderators; apart from the individual-level covariates, we consider as moderators whether the
data was collected online or in the lab, whether the CRT was incentivised or not, whether the
social preference decisions were made under time constraints (time pressure or time delay) or
not, and the country in which the study was conducted. In the main text, for the sake of brevity,
we summarise the results. The detailed analysis can be found in the supplementary materials
Text S1.
We find that the effect of CRT on social preference classifications remains largely unaffected
whether gender is controlled for or not. We can thus conclude that it is the CRT score that
(partly) drives the relationship between gender and social preferences, and not the reverse.
9

Regarding the potential confounding factors, we first analyse the effect of age, as a basic
sociodemographic variable. Although the gender differences are slightly reduced in some cases
when we control for age, the results allow us to conclude that age does not explain the
mediation effect of CRT. Risk aversion and time preferences do not affect the results either
(although we find that women are more risk averse than men, as in previous studies; e.g.,
Charness & Gneezy 2012; no gender differences are observed for time preferences, also in line
with the literature).
We also consider cognitive ability (measured by Raven and math/numeracy proficiency tests)
as a potentially relevant confounding factor. According to the tripartite model of Stanovich
(2009a; 2009b), cognitive ability measures mainly differ from the CRT in that the latter does
not measure ability, strictly speaking, but the disposition to think analytically (see also
Pennycook et al., 2016; Pennycook & Ross, 2016). Yet, answering the CRT also requires some
level of cognitive ability (e.g., Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016).
While we find that women in general score lower in the cognitive ability measures considered
(in line with previous literature, as we study measures related to numerical and spatial ability;
e.g., Halpern, 2013; Hyde, 2014), our results indicate that CRT always explains a larger share
of the mediation than cognitive ability scores. In fact, the share left to be explained uniquely
by cognitive ability is negligible. In other words, it is cognitive reflection that drives all the
mediation effect, even that captured by cognitive ability measures (which also capture
cognitive reflection to some extent). This is conceptualised in Figure S30.
Finally, except for age, for which we find a significant moderation of the mediation on selfinterest suggesting that the mediation might be weaker for older participants, none of the
individual-level variables considered as moderators yield significance. With regards to the
aggregate-level moderators, we find several significant differences by country, but there is no
clear pattern in these moderations and all the main results are consistent across countries (i.e.,
the mediation effect of CRT is always of the same sign). This also applies to the rest of
aggregate-level moderators. Although we observe some significant moderation effects, none
of them is strong enough to compromise the mediation effect of CRT on gender differences in
social preference types.
Spitefulness
This paper is focused on explaining the often-reported gender differences in self-interest, social
efficiency, and egalitarianism. For the sake of completeness, we also study spitefulness, as a
fourth preference type, even though gender differences have not been reported in the literature.
This analysis is shown in the supplementary materials (see Figures S27-S29). We observe a
significant indirect effect of gender through CRT score for spitefulness, but we do not label it
as a mediated gender effect because the total effect of gender on spitefulness (i.e., path
[G→SPT]) is not significant. To be more specific, CRT score is negatively related to
spitefulness while gender is unrelated to it. Women are non-significantly more likely to be
classified as being spiteful than men but, after controlling for the CRT score, women are nonsignificantly less likely to be classified as being spiteful than men. The indirect effect, which
is the difference between these two non-significant effects, is significant. This leads us to
conclude that there is a mediation of CRT in spitefulness too (e.g., MacKinnon, 2008; Rucker
et al., 2011).
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DISCUSSION
In line with our hypothesis, we find that a sizeable fraction of the gender differences in
distributional social preferences is mediated by gender differences in cognitive reflection as
measured by the CRT. In other words, women are less likely to be classified as self-interested
and social efficiency-concerned and more likely to be classified as egalitarian than men, and
to some extent this is related to the fact that they rely comparatively more on intuition than
reflection. Importantly, we find that the mediation effect is barely affected by potential
confounding or moderating individual-level factors such as age, risk aversion, impatience, and
cognitive ability or by a series of potential aggregate-level moderators such as online vs. lab
data gathering, incentivised vs. non-incentivised CRT, time neutral vs. constrained decision
making in the social preferences task, and the country where the experiment was conducted.
The case of cognitive ability is particularly interesting. Despite the well-known positive
correlation between CRT and cognitive ability measures, our results show that cognitive ability
does not play a fundamental role in explaining gender differences in social preferences.
These results suggest that the biological and environmental factors (hormonal, cultural or
socio-ecological) that prompt women to rely more on intuition vs. reflection compared to men
can account for a sizeable part of gender differences in social preferences. Disentangling the
relative importance of evolutionary biological and socio-cultural pressures (for a review, see
Hyde, 2014), including the potential role of hormonal influences (e.g., Bosch-Domènech et al.,
2014; Cueva et al., 2016), for the current findings is an interesting avenue for future research.
We have studied people in societies with ‘standard’ patriarchal and patrilineal systems.
Therefore, our results might not apply to populations with different cultural gender roles,
power, and stratification levels. It has indeed been shown that some gender differences which
are typically observed in patriarchal societies do not hold, or might even reverse, in societies
with matrilineal systems (Gneezy et al., 2009; Gong & Yang, 2012; Gong et al., 2015; Liu &
Zuo, 2019). Even though the countries considered here do not differ strongly in the
masculinity-femininity dimension (Hofstede, 1984), there are relevant differences. In a list of
66 countries with Japan (score = 95) as the most masculine and Sweden (score = 5) as the least
masculine, UK (score = 66), USA (score = 62), India (score = 56), and Spain (score = 42),
occupy the 12th, 18th, 25th, and 49th positions, respectively. Still, we find very similar results
across countries. Further research should explore the potential impact of the socio-cultural
context—in particular, patriarchalism and gender equality—on the findings reported here (see,
e.g., Falk & Hermle, 2018). The role of culture-specific gender stereotypes (Schmid Mast,
2004) might be crucial to understand why men and women differ in social preferences and
cognitive reflection.
Recent research has demonstrated that men’s choices are more extreme than women’s, i.e.,
there is greater within-gender variability among males, in tasks measuring cooperation, risk,
and time preferences (Thöni et al., 2021; Thöni & Volk, 2021). One may speculate that selfinterest and social efficiency might be characterised as more “extreme” social preferences than
egalitarianism, which appears to the most common behavioural type. Furthermore,
egalitarianism typically results in less extreme payoff distributions compared to other
behavioural types. However, our data cannot answer whether gender differences in withingender variability influence the current findings.
Finally, we should point out that the mediation effect of cognitive reflection is only partial.
There exists a non-negligible fraction of the gender differences in social preferences that is not
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explained by cognitive reflection. Future mediation studies should try to complete the picture.
Potential candidates for mediation might be agreeableness, aggression, emotional intelligence,
or empathy, for which gender differences have already been shown (Christov-Moore et al.,
2014; Hyde, 2014; Cabello et al., 2016).

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Overview of the Studies
Our dataset contains 6,910 observations from seven studies. All studies had received ethical
approval from their respective institutions. In all studies, participants completed, among other
tasks, an extended 7-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005; Toplak,
West, & Stanovich, 2014), in which performance was incentivised in Studies 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Participants also completed an incentivised 6-item task measuring their distributional social
preferences (Bartling et al., 2009; Corgnet et al., 2015a). We included all the studies we
previously conducted where participants completed both the 7-item CRT and the 6-item social
preference task and reported their gender (we excluded participants answering “other” gender,
which was an available option in Study 5, 6, and 7; in total, only 17 participants chose the
“other” option (11 in Study 5 and six in Study 7)). The latter allows the classification of
participants into four behavioural types: self-interested, socially efficient, egalitarian, and
spiteful. These are the only studies we are aware of that have jointly collected these three
variables using the mentioned tasks to measure cognitive reflection and social preferences.
The sample sizes reported below refer to the final samples after excluding participants with
missing information for any of the three variables (the total number of participants excluded
for having missing values is 69, i.e., 1% of the sample (max: 5% in Study 7)). To maximise the
information obtained from the meta-analysis, whenever possible, we divided the studies into
subsamples according to methodological differences such as treatments or experimental
conditions that apply to decisions made before the relevant measures were gathered. We did so
even though most of these differences are trivial and are not expected to affect the results. This
procedure results in a total of 29 subsamples.
Study 1
Study 1 was conducted at the Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, USA
(n=1,638; 58.4% female; mean age 19.69 ± 2.11 (SD)). At the beginning of the academic year
2014/2015, college students that were registered in the laboratory database were invited to
participate in an extensive 1-hour survey. This survey included a large number of individual
characteristics such as fluid intelligence (Raven, 1936); verbal reasoning skills (Wonderlic,
1992); social intelligence (Baron‐Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001); score in the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT); risk attitudes (Holt & Laury, 2002); time preferences
(Laibson, 1997; Espín et al., 2019); loss aversion (Mrkva et al., 2020; Gächter et al, 2021); and
adding-numbers skills (see Corgnet et al., 2015b). This study does not divide the database in
various subsamples because all the observations were collected in the same manner with the
same pool of participants and without any treatment variations.

Study 2
Study 2 includes data from a series of experiments conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental
Economics, University Carlos III Madrid, Spain. A total of 376 college students (49.5%
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female; mean age 21.06 ± 2.68 (SD)) participated in a laboratory experiment. The experiment
consisted of three different treatments which included several rounds of prisoners’ dilemmas
with a message suggesting what strategy to play. At the end of the main experiment,
participants responded to a short survey including the CRT and the distributional social
preferences task as well as other socio-demographic characteristics. A subsample of this data
set was used in Study 2 in Corgnet et al. (2015a). This study is divided into three subsamples
(labelled as follows: 201, 202, and 203) based on which message they received before making
the prisoner’s dilemma choice in the main experiment, with 106 (no message), 124 (“play
cooperative strategy”), and 146 (“play non-cooperative strategy”) participants, respectively.
Study 3
Study 3 was conducted online through Amazon Mechanical Turk (n=677 after excluding
duplicate IPs; 37.7% females; mean age 33.85 ± 10.45 (SD)). Participants were asked to
complete the distributional social preferences task under three different treatments varying the
amount of time available to make the decisions (intent-to-treat approach, see Bouwmeester et
al., 2017; Capraro, 2019): either time pressure (<5 sec), time delay (>15 sec), or time neutral
(see Capraro et al., 2017 for further details). The time neutral condition did not impose time
constraints on the decisions. The experiments were conducted with MTurkers from India and
the USA. At the end of the experiment, participants responded to a short survey including the
CRT and some socio-demographic questions. This study is divided into six subsamples (301
to 306) according to treatment and country, with 129 (USA, time neutral), 120 (USA, time
delay), 121 (USA, time pressure), 88 (India, time neutral), 124 (India, time delay), and 95
participants (India, time pressure), respectively.
Study 4
Study 4 was conducted online with first-year Business Economics university students using
the Behave4 Diagnosis platform (https://diagnosis.behave4.com). A stratified sample of all
first-year Business Economics students in public universities in Spain, using the universities
as sampling strata to achieve national representativeness, were invited to participate. The
sample consists of 570 participants (52.6% females; mean age 19.24 ± 2.80 (SD)). Apart from
a socio-demographic questionnaire, all participants completed a series of 14 tasks in random
order, namely the CRT; the distributional social preferences task; a time preferences task
(Espín et al., 2019), a risk preferences task (Holt & Laury, 2002), a loss aversion task (Mrkva
et al., 2020; Gächter et al, 2021); a remote associates test of creativity (Mednik, 1962); a taste
for competition task consisting of adding numbers (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007); a dictator
game (Forsythe et al., 1994); an ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982); a trust game (Ermisch et
al., 2009); a public goods game (Ledyard, 1995); a stag hunt game (Skyrms, 2004); a thirdparty punishment game (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004); and a beauty contest game (Nagel, 1995).
More details about the experiment can be found in Amador-Hidalgo et al. (2021). This study
is divided into two subsamples (401 and 402) depending on the treatment the participant was
randomly assigned to (i.e., complete the experiment in the morning, 9:00 am, or in the evening,
9:00 pm), with 215 and 355 participants, respectively.
Study 5
Study 5 was conducted on MTurk with 2,350 USA-based participants after excluding duplicate
IPs (54.8% females; mean age 38.30 ± 11.82 (SD)). Study 3 in Cabrales et al. (2021) uses data
from this experiment (in particular, treatments 1 and 4; see below). The main experiment
consisted of six treatments of the trust game and participants were randomly assigned to play
the role of either trustor or trustee (note that this is the only study in which participants were
assigned to different game roles before completing the CRT and the social preferences task).
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In treatments 1 and 4, trustees made their decisions under time pressure (<10 sec) and time
delay (>10 sec), respectively. In both cases the trustor had to decide whether to trust the trustee
under both time pressure and time delay in random order (thus, there are no treatment
differences for trustors). In treatments 2 and 5, trustees made their decisions under time
pressure and time delay, respectively. However, the trustor was the one who chose the time
condition of the trustee and would be randomly matched with a trustee deciding under the
chosen time condition (again, no treatment differences for trustors). Treatments 3 and 6 were
identical to treatments 2 and 5, except for the fact that trustees were informed that the trustor
chose the time condition. After the main experiment, participants completed the CRT; the
distributional social preferences task; and a socio-demographic survey, as well as tasks on risk
and time preferences and loss aversion (see Holt & Laury, 2002; Espín et al., 2019; Mrkva et
al., 2020; Gächter et al, 2021). This study is divided into subsamples depending on the
treatment and role (trustor or trustee) participants were assigned to in the main experiment.
Because the three pairs of treatment conditions were identical for the role of trustor, we are left
with nine subsamples (501 to 509) of the following sizes: 375 (trustor, treatments 1 and 4), 198
(trustee, treatment 1), 405 (trustor, treatments 2 and 5), 194 (trustee, treatment 2), 373 (trustor,
treatments 3 and 6), 206 (trustee, treatment 3), 200 (trustee, treatment 4), 198 (trustee, treatment
5), and 201 (trustee, treatment 6).
Study 6
Study 6 is an extension of Study 5 and was conducted on MTurk with 793 USA-based
participants after excluding duplicate IPs (52.7% females; mean age 37.84 ± 11.55 (SD)).
Study 2 in Cabrales et al. (2021) uses data from this experiment. The main experiment consisted
of two treatments of the trust game and participants were randomly assigned to play the role of
either trustor or trustee. The trustee was asked to decide either under time pressure (treatment
1) or time delay (treatment 2) but, in contrast to Study 5, trustors were also assigned to one of
the two treatments (i.e., they were informed of the timing condition imposed on the matched
trustee and decided whether to trust or not, without knowing the existence of other timing
conditions). After the main experiment, participants completed the CRT; the distributional
social preferences task; and a socio-demographic survey, as well as tasks on risk and time
preferences and loss aversion (Holt & Laury, 2002; Espín et al. 2009; Mrkva et al., 2020;
Gächter et al, 2021). The recruitment excluded individuals who had participated in Study 5.
This study is divided into four subsamples (from 601 to 604) depending on the treatment and
role (trustor or trustee) assigned in the main experiment, with 196 (trustor, treatment 1), 200
(trustor, treatment 2), 199 (trustee, treatment 1), and 198 participants (trustee, treatment 2),
respectively.
Study 7
Study 7 was conducted at the Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics,
University of Nottingham, UK. The main purpose of this study was to analyse the validity of
online experiments and identify potential differences with laboratory experiments (see Lee,
2017). No previous preprint or published article uses data from this experiment. Participants
(n=506; 61.4% females; mean age 21.67 ± 3.67 (SD)) were college students recruited to
participate in a two-day experiment conducted both in the laboratory and online. In one of the
two days of the experiment, participants responded to an extensive survey measuring individual
characteristics such as fluid intelligence (Raven, 1936); emotional intelligence (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001); personality traits (Soto & John, 2017); Machiavellianism (Christie, 1970); risk
preferences (Dohmen et al., 2010; Brink & Rankin, 2013); the CRT; and distributional social
preferences. Participants played several economic games (dictator game, ultimatum game, trust
game, prisoners’ dilemma, and public goods game) on the other day of the experiment. The
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order of these two days was randomised. This study is divided into four subsamples depending
on the randomly assigned treatment, namely whether the experiment was conducted online or
in the lab, and whether the survey was conducted in the first or second day of the experiment.
The four subsamples (701-704) include 136 (online, survey in the first day), 246 (lab, survey
in the first day), 69 (online, survey in the second day), and 55 participants (lab, survey in the
second day).
Main measures
Cognitive reflection test (CRT). All participants in the seven studies completed the extended
version of the CRT (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014). The CRT is based on seven questions
which prompt an intuitive/automatic yet incorrect answer that needs to be overridden to find
the reflective/correct solution. To exemplify the type of questions contained in the CRT, the
three items from Frederick (2005) read as follows:
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? ____ cents
[Correct answer: 5 cents; intuitive answer: 10 cents]
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? ____ minutes
[Correct answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes]
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake? ____ days
[Correct answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days]
The original questions were modified in Studies 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 so that participants could not
find the answers online while completing the test. CRT scores were calculated as the number
of correct answers (ranging from 0 to 7; M = 2.914, SD = 2.121). We find significant
differences in the distribution of CRT scores across studies (p<0.001; Kruskal Wallis test; see
supplementary Table S1).
Note that our measure of CRT has been shown to be strongly correlated with self-reported
scales of cognitive style such as the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) or the faith
in intuition scales (Epstein et al., 1996; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). See, e.g., Frederick (2005)
and Pennycook et al., (2016).

Distributional social preferences task. All participants made six choices between two
possible allocations of money between themselves and another anonymous participant with
whom they were randomly matched. These decisions are presented in Table 1 (the exchange
rates of experimental currencies and the probability of being paid varied across studies, see
table notes). The first four decisions were obtained from Bartling et al. (2009) and the other
two decisions from Corgnet et al. (2015a), who extended the original test to better identify
social efficiency concerns.
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Table 1. Distributional social preferences task
Decision #
Decision 1
Decision 2
Decision 3
Decision 4
Decision 5
Decision 6

Option A payoffs
(DM, other)
(10, 10)
(10, 10)
(10, 10)
(10, 10)
(10, 10)
(10, 10)

Option A is
consistent with
SE / E (β ≥ 0)
E (β ≥ 0.5)
E / S (α ≥ 0)
E / S (α ≥ 0.125)
SE / E (β ≥ 0.25)
SI / E / S (α ≥ 0.25)

Option B payoffs
(DM, other)
(10, 6)
(16, 4)
(10, 18)
(11, 19)
(12, 4)
(8, 16)

Option B is
consistent with
S (β ≤ 0)
SI / S (β ≤ 0.5)
SE (α ≤ 0)
SI / SE (α ≤ 0.125)
SI / S (β ≤ 0.25)
SE (α ≤ 0.25)

Notes: DM refers to the decision maker; ‘other’ refers to the participant the DM was randomly matched with.
We show the social preference types consistent with each option in each decision: SI = self-interest, SE = social
efficiency, E = egalitarianism, S = spitefulness. If a social preference type is not associated with a decision
(e.g., self-interest in decision 1), it means that people with such a preference are indifferent between the two
options, thus both options would be consistent with that preference type. Next to the types, we show in
parentheses the social preference parameters (α, β) from Fehr & Schmidt (1999) that are consistent with each
option in each decision. In Study 1 and Study 2, two participants (randomly assigned to be acting as either DM
or ‘other’) per session were randomly selected to be paid for this task (average session size was 15 in Study 1
and 20 in Study 2). In Study 3, all participants were paid for this task. In Study 4, one out of every ten
participants were randomly selected to be paid for one randomly selected task from a total of 14 tasks. In Study
5 and Study 6, one out of every ten participants were randomly selected to be paid for one randomly selected
task from a total of 4 tasks. In Study 7, one out of every eight participants were paid for this task. In terms of
exchange rates, the benchmark payoff of 10 was exchanged for $1 in Study 1, €1 in Study 2, $0.90 ($0.30) in
Study 3 USA (India), €50 in Study 4, $1 in Study 5, $1 in Study 6, and £25 in Study 7.

Following Capraro et al. (2017), we used two different methods to classify participants into
social preference types. The two methods are detailed below.
Model-based classification
We classify participants using a generalised version of the model of Fehr & Schmidt (1999).
This classification follows the tradition in economics (e.g., Charness & Rabin, 2002; Fehr &
Schmidt, 2006). First, based on the six choices in the social preferences task, we calculated
valid ranges for the parameters αi and βi that refer to participant i’s aversion to disadvantageous
(i.e., “envy”) and advantageous inequality (i.e., “compassion”, also often referred to as
“shame”, “guilt”, or “solidarity”), respectively. We do not impose the parameter restrictions
used in the original version of Fehr & Schmidt (1999)—that is, αi ≥ βi ≥ 0—so that we can
generalise the categorization of participants beyond strict inequality aversion (egalitarianism).
We classify individuals’ choices as follows:
Self-interested, if they maximise the decision maker’s own payoff (αi = 0 and βi = 0);
Socially efficient, if they maximise the total joint payoff (αi ≤ 0 and βi ≥ 0, with αi > -0.5
or βi < 0.5);
(iii) Egalitarian, if they minimise payoff inequality (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0);
(iv) Spiteful, if they maximise the decision maker’s relative standing by minimising the
other’s payoff (αi ≥ 0 and βi ≤ 0).
(i)
(ii)

Table 1 shows the ranges of the social preference parameters (αi, βi) that are consistent with
each option in each decision of the task. In the analyses using the model-based classification,
we exclude participants whose choices were inconsistent (11.9%). Choices are classified as
inconsistent whenever we cannot infer a unique range for each of the model parameters. These
are participants for whom the range inferred for either αi or βi from one decision does not match
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the range inferred from another decision. The sample size for the model-based analysis is thus
reduced to 6,090 observations. Note that excluding inconsistent individuals modifies the
sample composition since higher CRT is associated with a lower likelihood of being
inconsistent (p<0.001 whether controlling for gender or not; meta-regression). Thus, CRT
scores are on average higher in this sample. Yet, the gender composition is barely affected (the
effect of gender on the likelihood of being inconsistent yields p>0.12 without controlling for
CRT, and p>0.37 controlling for CRT). Table S2 displays the distribution of choices across
studies. Choices differ across studies for all six decisions (Kruskal-Wallis test, all p’s<0.001).
Choice-based classification
In the ‘choice-based’ definition we say that a participant’s preferences are consistent with a
specific motive if at least 2/3 of his/her choices are consistent with that motive (following the
tradition in social psychology; e.g., Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange et al., 2007). In
Table 1, we show the social preference types that are consistent with each option in each
decision. It follows that, unlike the model-based definitions, the choice-based method does not
produce a mutually exclusive categorisation of the social preference types. Also, the choicebased definition does not exclude those individuals whose choices were inconsistent with the
model definition. Thus, the analyses using this definition consider all the 6,910 observations.
The classification of participants using the choice-based method is largely consistent with the
model-based approach. The Spearman correlation coefficients between the two classifications
are 0.519, 0.599 and 0.413 (all p’s<0.001, n=6,090) for efficiency, egalitarian and spiteful
motives, respectively. Both definitions are equivalent for self-interest (except that the choicebased definition does not exclude inconsistent individuals).
Statistical strategy
Following Baron & Kenny (1986) and further developments (see MacKinnon, 2008), a
mediation analysis needs to explore four relationships:
•
•
•
•

[G→CRT]. The effect of the independent explanatory variable (i.e., G stands for
gender) on the mediator (i.e., CRT score);
[CRT→SPT]. The effect of the mediator on the dependent variable (i.e., SPT stands for
social preference type);
[G→SPT]. The effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable;
[CRT; G→SPT]. The effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable when
the mediator is controlled for.

We will say that there is an effect of gender on social preferences that is mediated by CRT
score whenever paths [G→CRT], [CRT→SPT], and [G→SPT] are all statistically significant
and the difference between the gender effect estimated in [G→SPT] and [CRT; G→SPT], i.e.,
the indirect effect of gender on social preferences through CRT score, is also statistically
significant. This indirect effect is labelled as [G→CRT→SPT]. Thus, using meta-analytic
techniques we test the overall significance of these effects with random-effects weights using
the DerSimonian & Laird (1986) inverse-variance method. Following Cheung (2020), for the
indirect effect [G→CRT→SPT], we estimate structural equation models with gender as
independent variable, CRT score as mediator, and a dummy for the social preference type as
dependent variable. We repeat the estimation in each of the 29 subsamples to obtain the indirect
effect and its standard error for each case, and then run a meta-analysis to test the overall
significance of the indirect effects (see Cheung, 2020, for an overview of the statistical
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strategies to deal with meta-analyses of mediation effects). We conduct the same analysis for
each of the dependent variables, that is, each of the social preference types. We use linear
probability models to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients although the results are
qualitatively similar when using either probit or logit specifications. The main econometric
specification is therefore:
(1) SPTi = γ10 + γ11CRTi + γ12Gi + ε1
(2) CRTi = γ20 + γ21Gi + ε2
Where SPTi is a dummy defining a social preference type (=1 if the individual i is classified
into that social preference, =0 otherwise), CRTi is the CRT score of individual i (from 0 to 7),
Gi refers to the individual i’s gender (=1 if female, =0 if male). γ10 and γ20 are the constant
terms, whereas ε1 and ε2 are the error terms, associated to each equation. Thus, the difference
between γ12 in equation (1) above and γ31 in [G→SPT] (i.e., SPTi = γ30 + γ31Gi + ε3) yields the
indirect effect of mediation [G→CRT→SPT].
For the sake of brevity, in the main text we focus on paths [G→SPT] and [CRT; G→SPT], and
their difference (i.e., the indirect effect, [G→CRT→SPT]). The details of the analyses of paths
[G→CRT] and [CRT→SPT] are relegated to the Supplementary Materials given that they have
already been explored in prior work and our results corroborate the previously known effects.
To check for potential confounds and to alleviate possible omitted-variable concerns, we also
test whether gender drives the relationship between CRT and social preferences (see
Supplementary Materials). That is, we explore whether the effect of CRT on social preferences
is reduced when gender is controlled for. Finally, we also test the robustness of the results to a
series of potential confounding factors and moderators, such as age, country, cognitive ability,
risk and time preferences, and methodological differences between studies/subsamples (e.g.,
whether the CRT was incentivised or not, whether the data was gathered online or in a physical
lab, and whether the social preferences decisions were made under time constraints).
All statistical analyses were conducted using Stata v.15 (StataCorp).

Data availability
All data underlying the results reported in our manuscript can be found at [LINK].
Code availability
Analysis code for STATA can be found at [LINK].
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Text S1. Robustness checks
S1.1. Can gender explain the link between CRT score and social preferences?
To test whether gender explains the link between CRT scores and social preferences we perform the
same analyses using CRT as the main explanatory variable. We find that the effect of CRT on social
preference classifications remains largely unaffected whether gender is controlled for or not. This is
reported in Figures S2-S7. In particular, the effect of CRT on social preferences is reduced by only
5% to 12% when gender is controlled for. Although the overall indirect effects are significant for the
three preference types under both classification approaches (p<0.01; see right panels in Figures S2S7), they are rather small (all below 0.004 in absolute value). Therefore, we can conclude that it is
the CRT score that (partly) drives the relationship between gender and social preferences, and not the
reverse.

S1.2. Confounding factors
S1.2.1. Age
Regarding the potential confounding factors, we first analyse the effect of age, as a basic
sociodemographic variable (age information is missing for three individuals, one in Study 1 and two
in Study 5, thus they are excluded). As we will do for the rest of potential confounds, we report the
main results once age is controlled for.
We find that the effect of gender (i.e., “female”) on model-based self-interest is -0.077 (-0.103, 0.051), which is reduced by 32% to -0.052 (-0.082, -0.023) after controlling for CRT score, while
that on choice-based self-interest is -0.072 (-0.093, -0.051), which is reduced by 35% to -0.047 (0.072, -0.021) after controlling for CRT score. For model-based social efficiency, the gender effect is
-0.131 (-0.163, -0.100) which is reduced by 43% to -0.075 (-0.106, -0.045) after controlling for CRT
score, whereas that for choice-based social efficiency is -0.083 (-0.103, -0.063), which is reduced by
40% to -0.050 (-0.071, -0.028). Finally, we find that the effect of gender on model-based
egalitarianism is 0.154 (0.126, 0.181), which is reduced by 34% to 0.102 (0.075, 0.128) after
controlling for CRT score, while that on choice-based egalitarianism is 0.117 (0.092, 0.143), which
is reduced by 23% to 0.092 (0.065, 0.118). All these overall effects are significant, as is the effect of
CRT (p<0.001), which is never reduced (in some cases, it is even increased by up to 3%). All the
indirect effects of gender on social preferences though CRT are significant (p<0.001). Therefore,
although the gender differences are slightly reduced in some cases when we control for age, these
results allow us to conclude that age does not explain the mediation effect of CRT score.
S1.2.2. Risk preferences
Second, we study whether risk preferences may act as a confounding factor. Gender differences in
risk taking are well-known; women seem to be more risk averse than men (Charness & Gneezy 2012;
recent evidence suggests that hormonal influences can explain part of this gender difference, e.g.,
Brañas-Garza et al., 2018b). There is also some (albeit weak) evidence of a relationship between risk
preferences and CRT scores (see, e.g., Frederick, 2005; Amador et al. 2019) and social preferences
(Brock et al., 2013; Fahle & Sautua, 2020). Thus, risk preferences might affect the relationships under
study. Given that the tasks used to elicit risk preferences, or their parameterizations, differ across
studies (see Section “Overview of the Studies” in the Materials and Methods), we use the total number
of risk averse choices in the task as a measure of risk aversion and then standardise the variable within
each study to get a comparable measure. This analysis excludes Study 3, in which risk preferences
2

were not elicited, and 50 participants (46 in Study 1 and four in Study 4) who did not complete the
test.
We find that after CRT is controlled for the gender effect is reduced by 29% from -0.078 (-0.102, 0.053) to -0.055 (-0.085, -0.024) for model-based self-interest, and by 33% from -0.072 (-0.093, 0.052) to -0.048 (-0.073, -0.022) for choice-based self-interest. For social efficiency, the gender effect
is reduced by 38% from -0.136 (-0.173, -0.099) to -0.085 (-0.119, -0.050) using the model-based
approach, and by 35% from -0.081 (-0.105, -0.057) to -0.053 (-0.078, -0.027) using the choice-based
approach. Finally, we find that the gender effect is reduced by 30% from 0.159 (0.127, 0.191) to
0.112 (0.082, 0.142) for model-based egalitarianism, and by 19% from 0.121 (0.096, 0.146) to 0.098
(0.070, 0.126) for choice-based egalitarianism. These overall gender effects are significant, as is the
effect of CRT (p<0.001), which is never reduced by more than 1%. All the indirect effects of gender
on social preferences though CRT are significant (p<0.001). Therefore, although women are more
risk averse than men in our data (0.106 SD (0.039, 0.174), p<0.001; random-effects meta-analysis
overall effect), gender differences in risk preferences do not account for the mediation effect of CRT.
S1.2.3. Time preferences
Third, we study the potential confounding effect of time preferences, that is, “impatience” or time
discounting. We chose this variable because it has been associated with both social preferences (e.g.,
Espín et al., 2019) and CRT scores (e.g., Frederick, 2005), although the evidence on gender
differences in time preferences is mixed. We consider two types of intertemporal decisions available
in all studies except Study 3 (in which time preferences were not elicited), referring to short-term and
long-term discounting. Short-term impatience measures the number of times the participant chooses
the sooner and smaller reward in a task consisting in choosing between receiving an amount of money
immediately or a larger amount of money in the future. Long-term impatience differs from short-term
impatience because the sooner reward is also delayed. For the same reasons as for risk aversion, we
standardised the two measures of impatience within studies. Time preference information is missing
for 51 individuals (46 from Study 1 and five from Study 4), thus they were excluded. The two
impatience measures were strongly positively correlated (within-study Pearson correlations between
0.623 and 0.800). Short-term impatience might be especially relevant to our analysis because previous
studies suggest that it is related to emotion and impulsivity, which is supposed to be a key
characteristic of individuals scoring low on the CRT (Frederick, 2005), whereas long-term time
preferences reflect more evaluative considerations (McClure et al., 2004; Figner et al., 2010).
However, we performed the analysis for both measures separately and obtained very similar results
(in line with Espín et al., 2015, but in contrast to Espín et al., 2019). For the sake of brevity, we thus
averaged the two individual measures into a composite measure of impatience for the meta-analysis.
For self-interest, we find that adding CRT as a control reduces the gender effect by 26% from -0.078
(-0.100, -0.055) to -0.058 (-0.088, -0.029) using the model-based approach, and by 32% from -0.073
(-0.093, -0.052) to -0.050 (-0.075, -0.025) using the choice-based approach. For social efficiency, the
gender effect is reduced by 35% from -0.134 (-0.170, -0.099) to -0.087 (-0.121, -0.052), and by 33%
from -0.079 (-0.102, -0.055) to -0.053 (-0.079, -0.027), respectively. For egalitarianism, the gender
effect is reduced by 28% from 0.158 (0.128, 0.188) to 0.114 (0.085, 0.144), and by 16% from 0.122
(0.098, 0.146) to 0.102 (0.074, 0.130), respectively. All these overall gender effects are significant,
as is the effect of CRT (p<0.001), which is not substantially altered (in no case the reduction is larger
than 10%). All the indirect effects of gender on social preferences though CRT are significant
(p<0.001). Therefore, while the reductions are in general slightly smaller, time preferences do not
seem to account for the mediation effect under study. In addition, the gender effect on impatience is
not significant (-0.026 SD (-0.096, 0.043), p=0.456; random-effects meta-analysis overall effect).
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S1.2.4. Cognitive ability
Finally, we focus on the potential confounding effect of cognitive ability, which is particularly
relevant since cognitive ability measures typically correlate with CRT performance (e.g., Stanovich,
2009a; 2009b; Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). However, Stanovich's
(2009a; 2009b) tripartite model emphasises that cognitive reflection is conceptually different from
cognitive ability, as it refers to a disposition (to think analytically), not to an ability strictly speaking
(see also Pennycook et al., 2016; Pennycook & Ross, 2015). Cognitive ability is typically associated
with computational efficiency and working memory capacity (Mackintosh, 2011) whereas cognitive
reflection is associated with critical and rational thought (Toplak et al., 2011). Yet, it is expected that
answering the CRT correctly may involve some level of cognitive ability, and that cognitive ability
measures may capture reflection to some extent (Corgnet et al., 2015a; Pennycook et al., 2015;
Pennycook & Ross, 2016; Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016; Capraro et al.,
2017). In other words, both the CRT and the cognitive ability tests are measurement tools with some
measurement error and that capture not only cognitive reflection and cognitive ability, respectively,
but also other factors (including cognitive ability and cognitive reflection, respectively, as well as
motivation, context, etc.). See Figure S30.
There is also evidence of gender differences in cognitive abilities such as verbal, numerical, and
spatial ability (the last two being typically in favour of men; Hyde, 1981; 2005; 2014; Halpern, 2013;
Weber et al., 2014). As explained in the main text, we find a moderate gender difference in CRT score
(0.382 SDs). Interestingly, among all the 124 effect sizes reported in Hyde’s (2005) review of 46
meta-analyses on psychological gender differences, 96 (78%) are smaller than moderate. With
regards to cognitive variables, similarly moderate differences in favour of men are observed for
spatial ability (see also Hyde, 1981), while only mechanical reasoning and mental rotation yield larger
effect sizes (up to about 0.7). Moreover, cognitive abilities have been previously correlated with
social behaviour (e.g., Schoon et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2013; Carl & Billari, 2014). Controlling for
standard measures of cognitive ability thus provides a critical robustness check to isolate the distinct
role cognitive reflection plays in explaining gender differences in social preferences (Stanovich,
2009a; 2009b; Corgnet et al. 2015a; Capraro et al., 2017). For our analysis, we consider three different
measures of cognitive ability, namely the Raven test (Study 1, 2, and 7), a numeracy test (Study 3),
and an adding-numbers task (Study 1 and 4; for the latter we use the score in the initial phase of the
taste for competition task where there is no competition with other participants; see Section
“Overview of the Studies” in the Materials and Methods). As in previous analyses, we standardised
the measures within studies to get a single measure of cognitive ability (for Study 1, we averaged the
standardised scores in the Raven and adding-numbers tests).
As expected, the CRT score is moderately correlated with the measures of cognitive ability (the
within-study Pearson correlations between CRT score and the different cognitive ability measures
range between 0.228 and 0.595, all p’s<0.001, with numeracy yielding the largest correlation; the
whole sample correlation between CRT score and the composite measure of cognitive ability is 0.415,
p<0.001). These correlations are in line with previous studies (e.g., Corgnet et al., 2015a; Capraro et
al., 2017). For this analysis, we excluded Studies 5 and 6 because cognitive ability was not measured.
In addition, seven participants did not complete the cognitive ability test (six from Study 4 and one
from Study 7).
Importantly, note that the exclusion of Studies 5 and 6 yields some sizeable changes in the estimation
of gender effects on social preferences, especially for self-interest (see below). Once we control for
cognitive ability, we find that adding the control for CRT score reduces the gender effect on selfinterest by 85% from -0.034 ((-0.068, -0.000), Figure S11, central panel) to -0.005 (-0.044, 0.034)
using the model-based approach, and by 71% from -0.042 ((-0.073, -0.011), Figure S14, central panel)
to -0.012 (-0.050, 0.026) using the choice-based approach. For social efficiency, the gender effect is
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reduced by 34% from -0.120 ((-0.171, -0.069), Figure S12, central panel) to -0.079 (-0.128, -0.030),
and by 19% from -0.085 ((-0.114, -0.056), Figure S15, central panel) to -0.069 (-0.100, -0.037),
respectively. For egalitarianism, the gender effect is reduced by 29% from 0.138 ((0.104, 0.172),
Figure S13, central panel) to 0.098 (0.064, 0.132), and by 31% from 0.090 ((0.058, 0.123), Figure
S16, central panel) to 0.062 (0.029, 0.094), respectively. These overall gender effects are significant
(p<0.05), except that for self-interest after controlling for CRT score (both approaches yield p>0.52).
The effect of CRT remains significant in all cases (p<0.001). In addition, the indirect effects of gender
on social preferences through CRT are significant (p<0.001).
Given that cognitive ability seems to impact the results and that the exclusion of Studies 5 and 6 make
it difficult to assess the extent of such impact, we conducted a new series of meta-analyses for the
sample excluding Studies 5 and 6. First, we repeat the results for path [G→SPT] (see left panel in
Figures S11-S16) and [CRT; G→SPT]. In this sample, the overall gender coefficient when CRT is
not controlled for (and prior to controlling for cognitive ability) is, respectively for the model-based
and choice-based approaches, -0.052 (-0.092, -0.011) and -0.056 (-0.088, -0.024) for self-interest, 0.146 (-0.194, -0.098) and -0.099 (-0.125, -0.073) for social efficiency, and 0.160 (0.127, 0.194) and
0.106 (0.074, 0.138) for egalitarianism. These are reduced to -0.011 ((-0.054, 0.031), 79% reduction)
and -0.017 ((-0.058, 0.024), 70% reduction), to -0.083 ((-0.131, -0.034), 43% reduction) and -0.068
((-0.099, -0.037), 31% reduction), and to 0.101 ((0.068, 0.135), 37% reduction) and 0.065 ((0.032,
0.097), 39% reduction), respectively, after controlling for CRT. The gender effect is always
significant (p<0.001), except for the case of self-interest when CRT is controlled for (both approaches
yield p>0.41). According to the analysis of the indirect effects, all these reductions are significant
(p<0.001). These results suggest that the mediation of CRT in this sample is stronger than in the
whole sample for self-interest (both approaches), and to a lesser extent also for choice-based
egalitarianism, while it is similar in the other three cases (model-based egalitarianism and social
efficiency, both models).
To further understand the role of cognitive ability, in Figures S8-S16 we repeat all the main analyses
using cognitive ability instead of CRT score as the mediator. We find that women obtain lower scores
than men on the cognitive ability measure (-0.303 (-0.396, -0.211), p<0.001; significant in all studies
but Study 7; Figure S8). Note that, after controlling for CRT, the gender effect on cognitive ability is
substantially reduced to -0.113 SDs (-0.184, -0.041), although it remains significant (p=0.002). On
the other hand, in this sample the gender effect on CRT equals 0.498 SDs ((-0.564, -0.432), p<0.001)
and is reduced to -0.341 ((-0.404, -0.278), p<0.001) after controlling for cognitive ability.1 In Figures
S9 and S10, we show the meta-analysis of the effect of cognitive ability on each social preference
type under the model-based and choice-based approaches, respectively, without controlling for
gender (CRT is not included in any of these analyses). For self-interest, we find effects of 0.041
(0.016, 0.066) and 0.048 (0.026, 0.070), respectively. For social efficiency, the effect of cognitive
ability is 0.080 (0.059, 0.100) and 0.048 (0.024, 0.071), respectively. For egalitarianism, these effects
are -0.079 (-0.104, -0.054) and -0.055 (-0.078, -0.032), respectively. All these effects are significant
(p<0.001; and significant in two or three of the five studies considered depending on the social
preference type). Therefore, cognitive ability has the same sign as CRT score for all social preference
types, although its effects are somewhat weaker (in these five studies, the CRT effect was significant
in three to five cases depending on the social preference type).
1

We conduct the same analysis for the three cognitive ability measures separately (using only the relevant studies) and
find significant gender effects on numeracy (-0.514; p<0.001) and adding numbers (-0.421; p<0.001), but not on Raven
score (-0.083; p=0.157). This is in line with previous literature (Hyde, 2005). After controlling for CRT, these become 0.167 (p=0.021), -0.312 (p<0.001), and 0.040 (p=0.582), respectively. On the other hand, for the relevant studies in each
case, the gender effects on CRT, also in SDs, are -0.564 (p<0.001; which becomes -0 258, p<0.001, when numeracy is
controlled for), -0.526 (p<0.001; which becomes 0.341, p<0.001, when adding-numbers score is controlled for), and 0.459 (p<0.001; which becomes -0.399, p<0.001, when Raven is controlled for), respectively. Therefore, gender
differences in CRT are stronger than in any of the cognitive measures.
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In Figures S11-S16, we conduct the main meta-analysis of Figures M1-M6 but with cognitive ability
(CA) as the mediator, i.e., paths [G→SPT] (left panel) and [CA; G→SPT] (central panel), and their
difference given by the indirect effects of gender on social preferences through cognitive ability
([G→CA→SPT], right panel). The total effect of gender has been reported above (that is, respectively
for the model-based and choice-based approaches, -0.052 and -0.056 for self-interest, -0.146 and 0.099 for social efficiency, and 0.160 and 0.106 for egalitarianism; Figures S11-S16, left panel). After
controlling for cognitive ability (central panel; also reported above), these are reduced to -0.034 (35%
reduction) and -0.042 (25% reduction) for self-interest, to -0.120 (18% reduction) and -0.085 (14%
reduction) for social efficiency, and to 0.138 (14% reduction) and 0.090 (15% reduction) for
egalitarianism, respectively. According to the analysis of the indirect effects, all these reductions are
significant, except for choice-based efficiency (p=0.091; see right panel in Figures S11-S16).
Comparing the values reported in the previous paragraphs, we can see how the gender coefficient is
reduced in each step, that is, how much of the gender differences is mediated by CRT score and
cognitive ability score, respectively. For model-based self-interest, the gender effect is reduced by
90% when both cognitive ability and CRT scores are included (from -0.052 to -0.005), and this
percentage can be separated into 79% captured by CRT score (from -0.052 to -0.011) and 11% more
due exclusively to cognitive ability score. If we instead control first for cognitive ability score, the
reduction would be 35% (from 0.052 to 0.034), and the remaining 55% due exclusively to CRT score.
For choice-based self-interest, from the 79% total reduction (from -0.056 to -0.012), 70% is captured
by CRT score (to -0.017) and 9% is due exclusively to cognitive ability score. Adding first cognitive
ability score would yield a reduction of 25% (from -0.056 to -0.042), and 54% more uniquely due to
CRT score.
Regarding model-based social efficiency, the gender effect is reduced by 46% (from -0.146 to -0.079)
when both measures are included, 43% of which is captured by CRT score (from -0.146 to -0.083)
and the remaining 3% is due exclusively to cognitive ability score. If we control first for cognitive
ability score, the reduction would be of 18% (from -0.146 to -0.120), with the remaining 28% due
uniquely to CRT score. For choice-based social efficiency, from the 30% total reduction (from -0.099
to -0.069), all is captured by CRT score (from -0.099 to -0.068), leaving nothing to be explained
exclusively by cognitive ability score. Controlling first for cognitive ability score reduces the gender
coefficient by 14% (from -0.099 to -0.085), while the remaining 16% would be due uniquely to CRT
score.
Regarding model-based egalitarianism, we find that from the total 39% reduction (from 0.160 to
0.098), 37%% is captured by CRT score (from 0.160 to 0.101), with cognitive ability score
exclusively explaining 2%. Controlling first for cognitive ability score, the reduction would be of
14% (from 0.160 to 0.138), thus 25% being attributed solely to CRT score. Finally, for choice-based
egalitarianism, from the total 42% reduction (from 0.106 to 0.062), 39% is captured by CRT score
(from 0.106 to 0.065), and the remaining 3% is due uniquely to cognitive ability score. If we control
first for cognitive ability score, the reduction would be of 15% (from 0.106 to 0.090), with the
remaining 27% being explained exclusively by CRT score.
Taken together, these results indicate that CRT score always explains a larger share of the mediation
than the cognitive ability measure. Except for self-interest where it reaches 9-11% (although out of a
rather large mediation of 79-90%), the share left to be explained uniquely by cognitive ability score
is trivial. Thus, while answering the CRT correctly entails some level of cognitive ability, these results
also suggest that cognitive ability measures can capture cognitive reflection to some extent (e.g.,
Pennycook et al., 2015; Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). Yet it is cognitive
reflection that drives all the mediation effect, even that captured by cognitive ability measures (when
CRT is not controlled for). This argument is conceptualised in Figure S30. The area denoted as “X”
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refers to the share of gender differences in cognitive reflection which are captured by gender
differences in cognitive ability score (and by gender differences in CRT scores). Given that both CRT
and cognitive ability scores entail measurement error, the mediation is often slightly stronger when
scores on both measures are included, compared to when only CRT score is controlled for, because
the X area is measured with smaller measurement error (due to combining two instruments).
S1.2. Moderators
In this section, we explore how robust the results are to a series of potential moderators. Note that the
overall heterogeneity statistics (I2) reported in Figures M1-M6 (right panel) suggest that the indirect
effects differ between subsamples for the three preference types according to the choice-based
approach and for self-interest according to the model-based approach. This indicates that some
aggregate-level variables may moderate the mediation under study. We consider all the individuallevel variables tested earlier as confounds as well as the following aggregate-level variables: whether
the CRT is incentivised or not, whether the data is gathered online or in a physical lab, whether the
social preference decisions are made under time constraints or not, and country of the experiment.
The correlations between all the moderators can be found in Table S3.
For the individual-level moderators, we test meta-analytically the significance of the interaction term
between gender and each moderator on CRT score, i.e., on path [G→CRT], and that between CRT
score and the moderator on path [CRT; G→SPT]. Given that the indirect effect is calculated as the
product of the direct effects in these two paths, we can conclude that the mediation is effectively
moderated if one of these interaction effects is significant (Hayes, 2017; Edwards & Konold, 2020).
The results are presented in Table S4; we also include the interactions of the moderators with gender
on social preference types (i.e., on path [CRT; G→SPT]) for completeness.
Regarding the interaction between the moderators and gender on path [G→CRT], none yield
significance (all p’s>0.15). In addition, except for age on self-interest, no significant interaction is
found between the moderators and CRT on path [CRT; G→SPT]. The interaction between age and
CRT score is significantly negative on choice-based self-interest (p=0.021) and negative but not
significant on model-based self-interest (although it is marginally significant; p=0.064)2. Thus, the
older the participants the less positive is the relationship between CRT scores and self-interest. To
see how this is translated into moderated mediation, we perform a meta-analysis of the indirect effect
at different age groups. Given the large differences in age distributions across studies we compare the
indirect effects on self-interest for participants aged above and below the median age within each
study (the median age ranges from 18 to 35), resulting in groups with 23.8 and 36.7 years old on
average. Using the model-based approach (Figure S17), we find that the overall indirect effects for
participants below and above the study’s median age are -0.015 ((-0.023, -0.007), p<0.001) and 0.007 ((-0.013, -0.001), p=0.021), respectively. Using the choice-based approach (Figure S18), the
indirect effects are -0.020 ((-0.030, -0.010), p<0.001) and -0.010 ((-0.017, -0.004), p=0.002),
respectively. Therefore, among participants with above (within-study) median age the mediation on
self-interest is half the size of that among participants aged below the median according to both
classification approaches, although it remains significant. Our data do not allow a finer analysis of
this moderation because we have not enough age variability, but these results suggest that the
mediation effect for self-interest might vanish for older ages, to some extent, due to a reduction in the
positive relationship between CRT scores and self-interest at older ages. Future research should
explore the potential moderation effect of age on self-interest more systematically.

2

There is also a marginally significant interaction between age and CRT score on choice-based social efficiency, but we
will not consider it because the same interaction is not significant for the model-based definition and the sign of the
interaction is opposite.
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For the aggregate-level moderators and for the sake of brevity, we conduct again the meta-analysis
of the indirect effects of gender on social preference types through CRT by grouping subsamples
according to moderator categories instead of studies. This allows us to test the significance of the
moderation using the between-groups heterogeneity statistics provided in the figures. Only if the
heterogeneity between groups yields a significant statistic, we can say that the indirect effect is
moderated. This analysis is presented in Figures S19-S26.
Regarding the country of the experiment, we find that the indirect effects on self-interest using the
model-based approach (p=0.001 according to the between-groups heterogeneity statistics; Figure
S19, left panel) and on all the three types using the choice-based approach (p<0.009; Figure S20)
differ between countries. In particular, for both model-based and choice-based self-interest, the
indirect effect is largest in Spain and smallest in USA, with India and UK falling somewhat in
between. Yet, in all countries the indirect effect remains negative. For choice-based social efficiency,
the indirect effect is largest in USA, with Spain, India, and UK displaying similar (smaller) values.
The effect is consistently negative across all countries. Finally, for choice-based egalitarianism, the
largest indirect effect is observed in Spain and the smallest in India. The effect is positive in all
countries. These results suggest that the mediation effect varies across countries, although the
direction of the effect is consistent across countries and there seem to be no systematic patterns (i.e.,
countries rankings change from one preference type to another).
Whether the CRT was incentivised or not (Figures S21 and S22) and whether the experiment was
conducted online or in the lab (Figures S23 and S24) lead to a similar moderation of the indirect
effects. Both incentivizing the CRT and conducting the experiment online result in smaller indirect
effects (in absolute value) on model-based and choice-based self-interest, and on choice-based
egalitarianism (both p<0.001). However, the sign of the indirect effects remains the same across
specifications and these effects are significant in all cases (p<0.001). Note that except for two
subsamples in Study 7 (total n=205), in which the CRT was not incentivised, all the online
experiments incentivised the CRT, whereas all the lab experiments did not (see the correlation
between all the moderators in Table S3). Although we cannot know whether incentivizing the CRT
or conducting the experiment online reduces the indirect effects, we can conclude that the mediation
effects continue to hold across conditions.
Finally, the time conditions of the social preferences task (i.e., whether participants had to decide
under time pressure, time delay, or in the absence of time constraints (time neutral); Figures S25 and
S26) do not seem to impact the indirect effects. One exception is the case of choice-based social
efficiency (p=0.007) in which the time neutral condition yields slightly smaller mediation than the
other two conditions. Still, the indirect effects exhibit the same sign and are significant for the time
neutral condition in all cases (p<0.001). These results suggest that there is no systematic moderation
and therefore the mediation effect continues to hold across various time conditions.
In sum, none of the moderators considered display interaction effects that are strong enough to
compromise the mediation of CRT on gender differences in self-interest, social efficiency, and
egalitarianism. Except for the moderation effect of age on self-interest, for which the results are
somehow inconclusive, our analysis indicates that the mediation effect is fully robust to the variables
tested.
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Main meta-analysis supporting Figures (M1-M6)

Figure M1. Meta-analytic results for model-based self-interest. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on self-interest (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel
displays the effect of gender on self-interest when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect
of gender on self-interest through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.

10

Figure M2. Meta-analytic results for model-based social efficiency. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on social efficiency (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central
panel displays the effect of gender on social efficiency when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the
indirect effect of gender on social efficiency through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure M3. Meta-analytic results for model-based egalitarianism. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on egalitarianism (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central
panel displays the effect of gender on egalitarianism when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect
effect of gender on egalitarianism through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure M4. Meta-analytic results for choice-based self-interest. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on self-interest (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel
displays the effect of gender on self-interest when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of
gender on self-interest through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure M5. Meta-analytic results for choice-based social efficiency. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on social efficiency (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central
panel displays the effect of gender on social efficiency when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the
indirect effect of gender on social efficiency through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure M6. Meta-analytic results for choice-based egalitarianism. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on egalitarianism (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central
panel displays the effect of gender on egalitarianism when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect
effect of gender on egalitarianism through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Supplementary Tables (S1-S4)

CRT

Study 1
(n=1,638)

Study 2
(n=376)

Study 3
(n=677)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

13%
20%
19%
14%
14%
8%
7%
5%

8%
18%
27%
18%
13%
9%
7%
0%

9%
16%
14%
14%
13%
12%
12%
9%

Study 4
Study 5
(n=570) (n=2,350)
8%
20%
18%
18%
13%
12%
8%
4%

20%
19%
15%
10%
11%
11%
9%
6%

Study 6
(n=793)
17%
15%
14%
13%
14%
10%
9%
7%

Study 7
Total
(n=506) (n=6,910)
6%
11%
10%
13%
13%
17%
16%
14%

14%
18%
16%
13%
13%
11%
9%
6%

Table S1. Distribution of CRT scores across studies. The scores differ across studies (KruskalWallis test, p<0.001).

Decision #

Study 1
(n=1,638)

Study 2
(n=376)

Study 3
(n=677)

Decision 1
Decision 2
Decision 3
Decision 4
Decision 5
Decision 6

19%
68%
51%
61%
53%
10%

16%
75%
55%
68%
62%
12%

13%
62%
46%
62%
57%
10%

Study 4
Study 5
(n=570) (n=2,350)
17%
59%
42%
50%
50%
14%

10%
41%
41%
54%
35%
12%

Study 6
(n=793)

Study 7
Total
(n=506) (n=6,910)

7%
43%
40%
52%
36%
7%

16%
74%
48%
64%
62%
7%

13%
56%
45%
57%
46%
10%

Table S2. Distribution of choices (% choosing option B) in the social preferences task across
studies. The distributions differ across studies for all six decisions (Kruskal-Wallis test, all p<0.001).
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age
age

riskaversion

impatience

cognitive

USA

Spain

India

UK

incenCRT

online

tpressure

tdelay

1

riskaversion

0.0161

1

impatience

0.0073

0.0245

1

cognitive

0.0235

0.014

-0.0622

1

USA

0.3602

0.0082

0.0133

0.0235

1

Spain

-0.3914

-0.0005

-0.017

0.0127

-0.6815

1

India

0.0935

.

.

-0.0755

-0.369

-0.0859

1

UK

-0.1598

-0.012

0.0017

0.0102

-0.481

-0.112

-0.0606

1

incenCRT

0.6512

-0.008

0.0084

-0.0118

0.166

-0.0271

0.1634

-0.371

1

online

0.6203

-0.0246

-0.0091

-0.0189

0.0617

-0.0527

0.153

-0.1547

0.9368

1

tpressure

0.0901

.

.

-0.0099

-0.0764

-0.0715

0.3447

-0.0505

0.1361

0.1275

1

tdelay

0.1038

.

.

-0.0192

-0.1114

-0.0762

0.4306

-0.0538

0.145

0.1358

-0.0344

Table S3. Spearman correlations between all the moderators. The number of observations varies across table cells.
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1

Dependent variables:

CRT score

model self-interest

model efficiency

model egalitarian

choice self-interest

choice efficiency

choice egalitarian

coefficient

coefficient

coefficient

coefficient

coefficient

coefficient

coefficient

95%CI LB 95%CI UB 95%CI LB 95%CI UB 95%CI LB 95%CI UB 95%CI LB 95%CI UB 95%CI LB 95%CI UB 95%CI LB 95%CI UB 95%CI LB 95%CI UB
Interactions with gender
age X female

-1.013
-2.405

riskaversion X female

-0.082
0.379

-0.324

0.080

-0.004

-0.022
-0.124

impatience X female
cognitive X female

0.143

0.055

-0.010

0.159

-0.011

0.199

-0.078

-0.169

0.699

-0.459

0.047

-0.052

0.019

0.014

-0.002
-0.204

0.160
0.025

0.051
-0.057

0.421**

-0.046

0.034

-0.078

-0.022

0.121

-0.286

0.013

-0.004

-0.02

-0.014
0.039

-0.072

-0.004

0.034

-0.056

-0.022

0.142

0.017

0.048

-0.027

0.022

0.027+
0.018

0.259*

-0.011

0.047

-0.070

-0.004

0.500

-0.073

0.017

-0.055

-0.005

0.011
0.058

0.206
-0.028*

-0.015
0.034

-0.038

0.040

-0.070

-0.015

0.485
-0.000
0.014

0.009

-0.015

0.040

-0.025

-0.015

0.043
0.011
0.048

Interactions with CRT score
age X CRT

-0.078+
-0.160

riskaversion X CRT

0.005

-0.013
-0.078

0.001
-0.004

impatience X CRT

0.007

-0.004

-0.008

-0.058

0.008

0.005

-0.011
-0.015

0.077

-0.008

-0.161

0.002

0.005

-0.004

-0.005

-0.010

-0.002

0.011

0.006

-0.005
-0.015

0.110

-0.005

-0.016

0.005

0.007

-0.005

-0.010

-0.005

0.002
-0.001

0.008

-0.008

0.007
0.012

0.110
-0.004

0.002

-0.001
0.013

0.047

0.001

0.000

0.002
0.010

-0.013

0.054+

0.000

0.003

-0.002
0.012

-0.087*

-0.001

-0.005

-0.003
-0.017

0.051
-0.001

0.002

cognitive X CRT

0.010

0.005
-0.001

0.020

-0.013

0.010

Table S4. Moderation analysis for individual-level moderators. The table shows coefficients and lower and upper bounds of 95% CIs from meta-analyses
conducted separately for each moderator and dependent variable. In bold, we present the interactions with gender on path [G→CRT] and with CRT score on [CRT;
G→SPT], which provide the test for moderated mediation, whereas the interactions with gender on path [CRT; G→SPT] are shown for completeness (non-bold).
The number of observations varies across table cells. Age is divided by 100 to get meaningful coefficients. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10
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Supplementary Figures (S1-S30)

Figure S1. Meta-analytic results for the effect of gender (female) on CRT score.
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Figure S2. Meta-analytic results for model-based self-interest (with CRT score as main explanatory variable). The left panel displays the effect of CRT on selfinterest (total effect), the central panel displays the effect of CRT on self-interest when gender is controlled for (direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference
(i.e., the indirect effect of CRT on self-interest driven by gender). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S3. Meta-analytic results for model-based social efficiency (with CRT score as main explanatory variable). The left panel displays the effect of CRT on
social efficiency (total effect), the central panel displays the effect of CRT on social efficiency when gender is controlled for (direct effect), and the right panel displays
their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of CRT on social efficiency driven by gender). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S4. Meta-analytic results for model-based egalitarianism (with CRT score as main explanatory variable). The left panel displays the effect of CRT on
egalitarianism (total effect), the central panel displays the effect of CRT on egalitarianism when gender is controlled for (direct effect), and the right panel displays their
difference (i.e., the indirect effect of CRT on egalitarianism driven by gender). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S5. Meta-analytic results for choice-based self-interest (with CRT score as main explanatory variable). The left panel displays the effect of CRT on selfinterest (total effect), the central panel displays the effect of CRT on self-interest when gender is controlled for (direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference
(i.e., the indirect effect of CRT on self-interest driven by gender). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S6. Meta-analytic results for choice-based social efficiency (with CRT score as main explanatory variable). The left panel displays the effect of CRT on
social efficiency (total effect), the central panel displays the effect of CRT on social efficiency when gender is controlled for (direct effect), and the right panel displays
their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of CRT on social efficiency driven by gender). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S7. Meta-analytic results for choice-based egalitarianism (with CRT score as main explanatory variable). The left panel displays the effect of CRT on
egalitarianism (total effect), the central panel displays the effect of CRT on egalitarianism when gender is controlled for (direct effect), and the right panel displays their
difference (i.e., the indirect effect of CRT on egalitarianism driven by gender). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S8. Meta-analytic results for the effect of gender (female) on cognitive ability.
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Figure S9. Meta-analytic results for the effect of cognitive ability on model-based social preference types. From left to right, the panels refer to self-interest,
efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S10. Meta-analytic results for the effect of cognitive ability on choice-based social preference types. From left to right, the panels refer to self-interest,
efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S11. Meta-analytic results for model-based self-interest (cognitive ability as mediator). The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on self-interest
(path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel displays the effect of gender on self-interest when cognitive ability is controlled for (path [CA; G→SPT], direct effect),
and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on self-interest through cognitive ability; G→CA→SPT). Subsamples across studies are
labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S12. Meta-analytic results for model-based social efficiency (cognitive ability as mediator). The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on social
efficiency (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel displays the effect of gender on social efficiency when cognitive ability is controlled for (path [CA; G→SPT],
direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on social efficiency through cognitive ability; G→CA→SPT). Subsamples
across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S13. Meta-analytic results for model-based egalitarianism (cognitive ability as mediator). The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on
egalitarianism (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel displays the effect of gender on egalitarianism when cognitive ability is controlled for (path [CA;
G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on egalitarianism through cognitive ability; G→CA→SPT).
Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S14. Meta-analytic results for choice-based self-interest (cognitive ability as mediator). The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on self-interest
(path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel displays the effect of gender on self-interest when cognitive ability is controlled for (path [CA; G→SPT], direct effect),
and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on self-interest through cognitive ability; G→CA→SPT). Subsamples across studies are
labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S15. Meta-analytic results for choice-based social efficiency (cognitive ability as mediator). The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on social
efficiency (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel displays the effect of gender on social efficiency when cognitive ability is controlled for (path [CA; G→SPT],
direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on social efficiency through cognitive ability; G→CA→SPT). Subsamples
across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S16. Meta-analytic results for choice-based egalitarianism (cognitive ability as mediator). The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on
egalitarianism (path [G→SPT], total effect), the central panel displays the effect of gender on egalitarianism when cognitive ability is controlled for (path [CA;
G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on egalitarianism through cognitive ability; G→CA→SPT).
Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S17. Indirect effects of gender through CRT score on model-based self-interest (age groups). The left panel refers to participants aged below the withinstudy median age, whereas the right panel refers to participants aged above the within-study median age. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0
subsample#”.
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Figure S18. Indirect effects of gender through CRT score on choice-based self-interest (age groups). The left panel refers to participants aged below the withinstudy median age, whereas the right panel refers to participants aged above the within-study median age. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0
subsample#”.
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Figure S19. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on model-based social preference types (country). From left to right,
the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S20. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on choice-based social preference types (country). From left to right,
the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S21. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on model-based social preference types (CRT incentivised). From left
to right, the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S22. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on choice-based social preference types (CRT incentivised). From left
to right, the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S23. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on model-based social preference types (lab vs. online). From left to
right, the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S24. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on choice-based social preference types (lab vs. online). From left to
right, the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S25. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on model-based social preference types (SP time conditions). From
left to right, the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S26. Moderation analysis of the indirect effects of gender through CRT score on choice-based social preference types (SP time conditions). From
left to right, the panels refer to self-interest, efficiency, and egalitarianism. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S27. Meta-analytic results for the effect of CRT score on spitefulness. The left panel refers to the model-based classification, and the right panel to the choicebased classification. Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S28. Meta-analytic results for model-based spitefulness. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on spitefulness (path [G→SPT], total effect), the
central panel displays the effect of gender on spitefulness when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their
difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on spitefulness through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S29. Meta-analytic results for choice-based spitefulness. The left panel displays the effect of gender (female) on spitefulness (path [G→SPT], total effect), the
central panel displays the effect of gender on spitefulness when CRT score is controlled for (path [CRT; G→SPT], direct effect), and the right panel displays their
difference (i.e., the indirect effect of gender on spitefulness through CRT; [G→CRT→SPT]). Subsamples across studies are labelled using “study# 0 subsample#”.
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Figure S30. Share of gender differences in social preferences which can be explained by gender differences in cognitive
reflection and cognitive ability (conceptual model based on the results). Blue circle line: gender differences in CRT scores.
Blue area: share of gender differences in CRT scores which are not explained by gender differences in either cognitive reflection
or cognitive ability. Yellow circle line: gender differences in CAT (cognitive ability tests) scores. Yellow area: share of gender
differences in CAT scores which are not explained by gender differences in either cognitive reflection or cognitive ability. Red
circle line: gender differences in social preferences. Red area: share of gender differences in social preferences which are not
explained by gender differences in either cognitive reflection or cognitive ability. Purple area: gender differences in cognitive
reflection (which explain part of the gender differences in social preferences). Green area: gender differences in cognitive ability
which are explained by both CRT and CAT scores. X area: share of gender differences in cognitive reflection which are
explained by gender differences in CAT scores (as well as CRT scores). When only CRT score is included as control, the
mediation captures all the purple area (with some measurement error). When only CAT score is included as control, the
mediation captures area X (with some measurement error). When both CRT and CAT scores are included as controls, the area
X of gender differences in cognitive reflection is measured with smaller measurement error. That is why the mediation (i.e., the
share of gender differences in social preferences which can be explained by the control variables) is often slightly stronger when
both scores are included, compared to when only CRT score is included. Thus, it is the gender differences in cognitive reflection
that explain all the mediation effect, even that captured by cognitive ability measures.
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